Adani Cuts Power Supply to Bangladesh as Coal Disruption Hits Godda Plant

Context

The 1,600MW Godda power plant in India, run by Adani, supplies its electricity to Bangladesh under a 25-year agreement. However, the generation has now dropped because Indian Railways issues have delayed coal deliveries. To save energy for evening peak hours, Adani has cut daytime production.

The partnership has had a troubled history, where scrutiny began in 2023 when The Daily Star raised concerns about the 25-year agreement's high capacity charges and overall pricing structure. Tensions peaked in 2025 when Adani temporarily halted electricity supplies due to unpaid bills and disputes over coal prices. During this standoff, Bangladesh actively sought to revise the contract's terms while navigating ongoing legal challenges to the deal. Beyond financial friction, logistical issues have repeatedly strained the arrangement. In August 2026, severe storms and rain disrupted coal transport, triggering another significant reduction in power generation.

The big picture is that while Bangladesh heavily relies on Godda's electricity to meet domestic demand, frequent payment disputes, price disputes, and transport delays continue to raise questions about the partnership's long-term reliability.

Why It Matters

The problem is not that Bangladesh buys electricity from India. Cross-border electricity trade can strengthen energy security. The problem is having too few alternatives when one major source falters. Bangladesh is already dealing with shortages of gas and coal that are limiting domestic power generation. And now, when coal shortages, payment disputes or transport problems reduce production at Godda, Bangladesh has to find electricity elsewhere.

It also raises the question: how much of Bangladesh's electricity supply should depend on a single major foreign-financed power project?

What We Think

Adani may call this a temporary rail-and-coal problem. Bangladesh should see it as evidence of a deeper failure: the country’s electricity security has been tied too tightly to one privately controlled, foreign coal plant operating under a contract that has long invited questions over cost, capacity charges and accountability.

A supplier that can reduce daytime generation because its coal logistics inside India have broken down is not offering Bangladesh dependable power security. The immediate cause may be railway congestion, but the wider record is harder to dismiss: previous supply cuts over unpaid bills, disputes over coal pricing and repeated operational shortfalls have shown that Godda is not a neutral backup source. It is a strategic vulnerability with a very large invoice.

This is precisely why the Adani deal deserves tougher scrutiny—not simply another assurance that supply will “normalise shortly.” The Godda plant has reportedly been delivering only around 800–1,000MW since mid-August, far below its 1,600MW capacity, while Bangladesh is already struggling with constrained domestic generation and fuel shortages. A power contract cannot be judged only by its promised megawatts; it must be judged by what it delivers when the grid is under pressure.

The lesson is not that Bangladesh should abandon cross-border electricity trade. It should refuse to confuse dependence with energy security. Dhaka needs diversified import routes, stronger domestic reserve capacity, transparent review of expensive long-term power contracts, and clear penalties when suppliers fail to meet agreed dispatch levels. No single company—especially one with Adani’s history of leverage over Bangladesh’s power system—should be able to turn a disruption in its own coal supply chain into a national risk for millions of Bangladeshi consumers.