Babar Defends Need for Special Force, Calls for Political Neutrality in SRB
Former State Minister for Home Affairs Lutfozzaman Babar has argued that Bangladesh still requires a specialised security force akin to the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), while saying such a body cannot serve partisan interests. His remarks came as parliament, on 10 September 2026, passed the Special Response Battalion (SRB) Bill, paving the way for the abolition of the RAB and the establishment of a new specialised police unit.
In a Nutshell
- Parliament on Thursday passed the Special Response Battalion Bill, 2026, clearing the way for the abolition of RAB and the formation of SRB as a specialised unit under the Bangladesh Police.
- The SRB Bill was passed despite objections from opposition lawmakers, who questioned whether the proposal delivers substantive reform or retains RAB’s structure under a new name.
- Under the law, RAB’s personnel, orders, powers, authority, facilities, funds, assets, contracts, records and liabilities will transfer to the SRB.
- Former State Minister for Home Affairs Lutfozzaman Babar said RAB was formed during his tenure in response to terrorism, extortion and organised crime, and argued that Bangladesh retains a need for a specialised security force.
- Referring to his arrest on 28 May 2007, Babar alleged that he had personally experienced abuse of power through a fabricated arms case.
- Babar said the core issue is how the government manages and deploys a specialised force, rather than its name alone.
- Section 13 gives SRB officers of sub-inspector rank or above police investigating officer powers, while the bill does not explicitly make the exercise of those powers conditional on completing certified police-investigation training.
- The law allows a common discipline and conduct code, but permits the 2005 RAB Rules to remain operative until new rules are framed; the text contains no explicit protection for personnel who refuse unlawful orders or report wrongdoing.
- The law permits SRB custody and interrogation rooms, while concerns remain that “detain” is not clearly defined for civilians and that the requirement to transfer an arrested person to the nearest police station “without delay” specifies no fixed time limit.
Context
RAB was created in the early 2000s as a composite security force to confront serious crime, militancy, illegal arms, extortion and organised criminal networks. It later became one of Bangladesh’s most visible law-enforcement agencies, but also faced persistent domestic and international allegations of extrajudicial killing, enforced disappearance, torture, arbitrary detention and political targeting. The United States imposed sanctions on RAB and several current and former officials in December 2021, citing serious human-rights concerns.
The government approved the draft Special Response Battalion Act in August 2026 and introduced it in parliament on 3 September. Parliament passed the legislation on 10 September, alongside a new Armed Police Battalions law that repeals the earlier ordinance that provided the legal basis for the RAB. The SRB is intended as a specialised police unit for terrorism, organised crime, narcotics, illegal arms, cybercrime and violence against women and children.
The concerns extend beyond operational training. The law’s disciplinary provisions allow detention and punishment within the force, while complaint channels remain within the SRB command structure. Critics argue that the system lacks confidentiality, protection from retaliation and an independent reporting route for personnel who decline unlawful operational orders or disclose misconduct. Questions over civilian detention are also tied to RAB’s past record: the material highlights findings concerning undeclared RAB detention sites and calls for publicly listed facilities and numbered custody registers.
Why It Matters
The passage of the SRB law marks a consequential moment in Bangladesh’s security-sector reform debate. It reflects an effort to retain high-capacity operational tools for confronting militant threats, transnational narcotics networks, cyber-enabled crime, illicit weapons and organised violence, while formally ending RAB’s legal existence. Yet the direct transfer of RAB’s workforce, infrastructure, powers, assets and records to the SRB makes the legal and institutional design of the new force decisive.
If personnel exercise investigative authority without verified instruction in criminal procedure, evidence rules, arrest standards, search law and case documentation, operational errors can weaken prosecutions and expose civilians to unlawful action.
The lack of explicit safeguards for members who refuse unlawful orders can also discourage internal reporting where disciplinary detention, adverse career reports, punitive postings and other command sanctions remain possible. Civilian-custody provisions present a further test: an unclear power to “detain”, no defined maximum period for police-station handover, and SRB-run custody or interrogation rooms risk gaps in record-keeping and judicial oversight.
What We Think
Babar’s remarks underline that Bangladesh may retain the operational capacity of a specialised force, but its legitimacy depends on keeping it free from political use. The transition from RAB to SRB will have limited value if the new unit inherits the same opaque practices, an unchecked command structure, or allegations of partisan deployment associated with its predecessor. Transparency and accountability, therefore, remain central to the SRB’s credibility. Clear operational rules, professionally trained personnel, independent scrutiny of complaints and documented custody procedures can help ensure that the force serves public security rather than political interests. The test for SRB will be whether it operates under the law, produces reliable investigations and remains answerable to civilian institutions.