The new government that took office following Bangladesh’s February 2026 elections has pledged wide-ranging reforms intended to modernise the state apparatus and improve service delivery. Debates on governance reform have been front and centre, primarily in relation to the July Charter and efforts to ratify other reforms introduced by the 2024–26 interim government. Given the global economic and energy crises, economic-policy reform has understandably also been a priority for the new government.
One area that has not received the scrutiny it deserves, however, is the need to modernise Bangladesh’s national-security decision-making structure.
One area that has not received the scrutiny it deserves, however, is the need to modernise Bangladesh’s national-security decision-making structure. This lacuna has taken on greater significance as the government and society grapple with the question of whether Bangladesh should join the recently signed Mecca Pact, should it be invited to do so by the three founding members. At the same time, there has been public discussion about the possibility of Bangladesh purchasing advanced combat aircraft from China, alongside other proposed military procurements, but little transparency regarding the rationale for such enormous expenditures. Inextricably linked to this issue is the sensitive question of civil–military relations. In Bangladesh’s five decades as an independent country, the proper role of the armed forces has surfaced repeatedly as a source of political uncertainty. Most dramatically, military officers have directly intervened in the political system at several key junctures. At other times, their influence has been felt behind the scenes to varying degrees. Bangladesh has experienced different forms of civil–military relations: outright military rule; civilian governments operating under thinly veiled military influence; and a model in which civilian and military institutions function in almost entirely separate spheres. None of these models has proved wholly successful. The uncertainty surrounding the military’s proper role has been among the reasons Bangladesh’s democracy has rarely functioned as designed.
The uncertainty surrounding the military’s proper role has been among the reasons Bangladesh’s democracy has rarely functioned as designed.
There have been limited attempts in the past to reform Bangladesh’s national-security decision-making structure and normalise civil–military relations, but none has taken firm root. There is a long-established tradition of the Prime Minister retaining the Defence Ministry portfolio, rather than appointing a full-time minister to oversee it. One consequence has been that civilian governments have largely abdicated effective control over the military, beyond the question of senior personnel appointments.
Civilian governments have largely abdicated effective control over the military, beyond the question of senior personnel appointments.
At the same time, a number of sensitive issues related to the military — and the intelligence services, which have usually been led by serving military officers — have remained off limits. There is little transparency in military procurement, while concerns about corruption and waste regularly surface. The Bangladesh military’s role in international peacekeeping has acted as a safety valve, providing lucrative opportunities both for participants and for the services themselves. Likewise, military-related industries have flourished, alongside systems that provide other post-retirement benefits to those in uniform. More broadly, a culture of impunity has persisted in relation to allegations of misconduct by those in uniform, with rare exceptions made only in the most politically charged cases. During the 2024–26 interim-government period, the Yunus administration experimented with the appointment of a National Security Adviser. For a variety of reasons, the appointment was viewed with suspicion by the military leadership, which constrained the appointee’s ability to exercise fully the functions assigned to him. The new government has appointed a Defence Adviser to the Prime Minister, but this role has a narrower and more conventional focus. At no point has Bangladesh moved beyond the appointment of an individual National Security Adviser to establish the staffing, institutional support and decision-making architecture required to assist the Prime Minister effectively. There have been previous efforts to modernise Bangladesh’s defence institutions, including the Ministry of Defence, but these have faced stiff resistance from vested interests.
Parliament, too, has been marginalised on matters of national security.
Parliament, too, has been marginalised on matters of national security. Relevant parliamentary committees, Treasury MPs and members of the Opposition have had little meaningful role in scrutinising policy, expenditure or strategic choices. Bangladesh has several notable think tanks and academic departments focused on international relations and national security. Yet their number remains small compared with those in other comparable countries. Much of the funding available to these institutions and individual researchers has come from foreign donors, rather than from the state or domestic sources. For the most part, expertise in national security is assumed to arise from prior military service, with only a handful of exceptions. This assumption extends to the media, where national-security discussions are usually dominated by retired military officers whose views — and institutional loyalties — are inevitably shaped by their previous service. As the global environment adjusts to an increasingly multipolar order, and Bangladesh seeks to pursue its interests through a new “Bangladesh First” model, this is an appropriate moment to reassess existing structures and identify opportunities to modernise national-security decision-making. That would require more than simply appointing a full-time Defence Minister or a National Security Adviser. It would require developing a wider base of expertise, including among civilian officials and elected Members of Parliament, who could contribute to public debate, draft legislation, scrutinise expenditure and staff a professional national-security bureaucracy. Fortunately, Bangladesh need not begin from scratch. A number of international models offer useful lessons. Just as other ministries and functions of government require specialised knowledge, professional capacity and institutional accountability, so too does the national-security arena. To paraphrase Clemenceau: war — and national security — is too important to be left to the generals.
Jon Danilowicz is a retired U.S. diplomat. He is currently a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council and President of Right to Freedom.