WHO INVESTIGATES AN ACCUSED FORCE
01 / 07
NUTSHELL TODAY REPORT · HUMAN RIGHTS
The Insider's Verdict: Dr. Nabila Idris Dissects the NHRC Bill 2026The Insider's Verdict: Dr. Nabila Idris Dissects the NHRC Bill 2026
The Government repealed the 2025 Ordinance on the stated ground that a stronger law would follow. This is that law.
IN CONVERSATION
Why write this analysis of the NHRC Bill 2026 in the first place?
“I am a nerd for Bangladesh, that’s why!”
“But more seriously, laws are the ‘rules of the game’ and yet they are often presented as too complicated for ordinary citizens to understand. They should not be. In a democracy, people should know what rules apply, and have a chance to object before a bad law becomes settled law.”
Dr. Nabila Idris brings rare, hands-on authority to this analysis of the NHRC Bill 2026. Currently serving as a Commissioner on Bangladesh's National Human Rights Commission, she has an insider's vantage point on the very institution this legislation seeks to reshape, giving her insights that few outside analysts could offer. Her path to this role has been built on years of rigorous academic and field-based work: a master's in Social Policy from the University of York, a second master's in International Journalism and Communication from the Communication University of China, and a PhD from the University of Cambridge, where her doctoral thesis examined the politics of social protection policymaking in Bangladesh.
Before her NHRC appointment, Idris served as a member of the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances, one of the most consequential bodies formed during Bangladesh's post-uprising transition, where she helped document state repression under the previous government and pushed for institutional accountability. She also works as a part-time research fellow at the BRAC Institute of Governance and Development and founded the youth organization CommunityAction early in her career. Her sustained contributions to human rights advocacy earned her the Begum Rokeya Padak in 2025, one of Bangladesh's notable recognitions in this field.
This combination of academic depth in policymaking, direct experience investigating rights abuses, and current institutional standing inside the NHRC makes Idris uniquely positioned to unpack the bill's implications, both technical and political, for Bangladesh's human rights architecture.
ON METHOD
Walk us through how you arrived at that verdict.
“In some ways, I did not have to. I put the provisions side by side: the 2009 Act, the 2025 Ordinance and the 2026 Bill. The comparisons speak for themselves. My aim was to make the evidence transparent enough that readers could reach the verdict themselves.”
Four changes that matter
FOUR CHANGES THAT MATTER · 01
Security forces are placed beyond independent investigation, more firmly than in 2009.
Section 19 states that where a complaint concerns a disciplined force, the Commission may not send its own investigators. It must ask the accused force for a report on itself.
The 2009 Act at least directed that request to the Government; this 2026 Bill directs it to the accused force.
Effect
Victims of human rights violations by state forces are left with no independent body able to investigate their cases. Instead, the accused force investigates and reports on itself, while crucial evidence may disappear.
WHO INVESTIGATES AN ACCUSED FORCE
01 / 07
AWAMI LEAGUE ERA
The Commission asks the Government for a report on the accused force, with six months to respond.
s.18(1)
INTERIM ERA
The complaint runs through the ordinary investigation power, and no investigator may be drawn from the accused force.
s.16(2)
NOW
The Commission may not send its own investigators. It must ask the accused force for a report on itself, with no deadline fixed.
s.19(1)–(2)
What changed in 2026
The request for a report moves from the civilian government to the accused force itself, and the six-month limit becomes no limit at all.
IN CONVERSATION
Was there a specific provision that struck you the most while researching it?
“The provision on security forces investigating themselves. We had essentially lived with that system under the Awami League, and the 2025 Ordinance deliberately changed it. That Ordinance was not theoretical; it was actually in force.
“I used to get calls from police and military officers telling me how they were navigating the new landscape. Clearly they were adapting in real time. Seeing that progress reversed was probably the most striking part for me.”
FOUR CHANGES THAT MATTER · 02
Pluralism guarantees of 2009 are converted into suggestions in 2026.
The 2009 Act required that the Commission’s members include an ethnic community member. This Bill reduces that to a matter the selection committee should keep in priority consideration, where it judges a candidate qualified (s.5(3)).
"Qualified" is nowhere defined, and the committee that applies it is the same one the executive controls.
Effect
A Commission with no member from any ethnic or disadvantaged minority becomes lawful, because there is no longer any clause stating otherwise. The communities most distrustful of the state lose their only guaranteed voice on it.
A GUARANTEED MINORITY SEAT
02 / 07
AWAMI LEAGUE ERA
MANDATORY
A binding requirement: the members must include at least one woman and at least one member of an ethnic community.
s.5(3)
INTERIM ERA
MANDATORY, WIDENED
A gender parity duty, a minimum of two women, and one guaranteed seat for a minority member.
s.5(3), s.5(4)
NOW
DISCRETIONARY
One woman. Minority representation reduced to priority consideration for a candidate the committee judges qualified.
s.5(1), s.5(3)
What changed in 2026
A binding composition requirement present in law since 2009 becomes a matter for the selection committee to bear in mind.
FOUR CHANGES THAT MATTER · 03
The selection committee is re-politicised and the final choice returns to the executive.
The Appellate Division judge who chaired the 2025 committee is replaced by the Speaker. The Law and Home Ministers return as members. Five of nine seats now belong to the Government or the ruling party. The committee then sends two names rather than one for each Commissioner post to the President.
Under Article 48(3) of the Constitution, the President acts on the advice of the Prime Minister, which means the ruling party not only control the selection board, the Prime Minister directly controls who will ultimately be in the Commission. This ensures that the government chooses the people who will investigate the government.
Effect
Commissioners now owe their seats to the same executive they would need to investigate, so the Commission is structurally disposed to avoid or soften findings against the government and the forces it controls, before a single case is even filed.
WHO CHOOSES THE COMMISSIONERS
03 / 07
AWAMI LEAGUE ERA
POLITICAL COMMITTEE
Seven members, all political or official: Speaker, two ministers, Law Commission chair, Cabinet Secretary, two MPs.
s.7(1), s.7(4)
INTERIM ERA
JUDGE-LED
An Appellate Division judge in the chair, no cabinet ministers, plus academic, press and minority seats, with express power to consult civil society.
s.7(1), s.7(7)
NOW
POLITICAL COMMITTEE
Speaker in the chair, both ministers restored, press seat and civil-society consultation dropped. Two names per vacancy, interview stage dropped.
s.7(1), s.8(ঘ)
What changed in 2026
The judge in the chair is replaced by the Speaker, the ministers return, and the final choice passes back to the executive.
FOUR CHANGES THAT MATTER · 04
Complainants lose guaranteed legal-aid and litigation machinery.
Legal aid to complainants was an express function in 2009 (s.12(1)(দ)) and again in 2025 (s.13(ঘ)), backed in 2025 by a dedicated Legal Action Branch that was required to litigate on a complainant’s behalf (s.31(2)) and to constitute a standing panel of experienced lawyers (s.31(3)). Neither the function nor the branch appears in the 2026 Bill.
All that remains is permission to spend Fund money on legal assistance if the Commission chooses (s.34(3)). The Commission may therefore pay a lawyer’s bill, but nothing in the Bill empowers it to bring a case or appear in court on a victim’s behalf, and no office inside it has that job.
Effect
Complainants with no money or lawyer, who make up most victims, must now bring their own case unaided; and where the Commission decides a court could deal with the matter better, it simply refers them to litigation the victim cannot usually afford.
LEGAL AID AND ACCESS TO A COURT
04 / 07
AWAMI LEAGUE ERA
EXPRESS FUNCTION
Legal assistance is an express function, and the Commission could file an Article 102 application in the High Court for a proven victim.
s.12(1)(দ), s.19(1)(খ)
INTERIM ERA
FUNCTION + BRANCH
A legal-aid function, power to litigate for victims, and a Legal Action Branch with a standing panel of experienced lawyers.
s.13(ঘ), s.31(2)–(3)
NOW
SPENDING HEAD ONLY
Neither the function nor the branch survives. Legal assistance remains only as something the Commission’s Fund may be spent on.
s.34(3)
What changed in 2026
An express function and a dedicated branch are replaced by a permission to spend money, with no office inside the Commission to act on it.
Three further losses
Less visible than the four above, each removes a protection that Bangladeshi law already contained through the 2025 Ordinance, which was in force till it was repealed in April 2026.
THREE FURTHER LOSSES · 01
The National Preventive Mechanism loses its ring-fenced budget.
Under the 2025 Ordinance the NPM was a Division with a "separate" and "secured" budget allocation (s.30ক(8)). The 2026 Bill renames it a Unit and deletes both words, requiring only that the Commission keep a necessary allocation out of its own funds (s.33(8)).
The NPM must therefore depend on the Commission’s general budget and compete with its other functions for resources. Therefore, the statutory protection against financial pressure is materially weaker. This falls below what the UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture requires of a mechanism under OPCAT (Articles 18(1) and 18(3)), to which Bangladesh is a party.
FUNDING THE PREVENTIVE MECHANISM
05 / 07
AWAMI LEAGUE ERA
NO MECHANISM
No preventive mechanism of any kind exists under the 2009 Act.
No equivalent provision
INTERIM ERA
DIVISION, RING-FENCED
Constituted as a Division, with a budget allocation the statute calls both "separate" and "secured".
s.30ক(8)
NOW
UNIT, UNRING-FENCED
Renamed a Unit. "Separate" and "secured" both deleted; only a "necessary" allocation out of the Commission’s own funds.
s.33(8)
What changed in 2026
The mechanism itself is carried over from 2025. The two words protecting its budget are not.
THREE FURTHER LOSSES · 02
The explicit guarantee of institutional independence is withdrawn.
The 2025 Ordinance expressly stated that the Commission would not fall under any ministry or division of government. Although the 2026 Bill describes the Commission as an "independent institution" and requires it to act with complete impartiality (s.3(2)), it deletes the express protection against ministerial subordination.
A description of how commissioners should behave is not a guarantee of where the institution sits. In practice, the Commission returns to the Ministry of Law, as under the 2009 arrangement. This is antithetical to GANHRI’s requirement that independence from government be guaranteed in law.
GUARANTEE OF INDEPENDENCE
06 / 07
AWAMI LEAGUE ERA
GENERAL LANGUAGE
General "independent statutory body" language, with no bar on ministerial subordination.
s.3(2)
INTERIM ERA
EXPRESS BAR
The Commission shall not fall under any ministry or division of government.
s.3(2)
NOW
STATEMENT OF MANNER
An "independent institution" required to act with complete impartiality. The express protection is deleted; in practice the Commission returns to the Ministry of Law.
s.3(2)
What changed in 2026
The express protection against ministerial subordination is deleted, leaving a description of how the Commission should behave.
THREE FURTHER LOSSES · 03
The Commission loses its say over its own budget.
Under the 2025 Ordinance the Government was required to fix the Commission’s allocation having considered a proposal submitted by the Commission itself (s.35(1)). The 2026 Bill removes that requirement: the Government simply allocates. The Commission no longer has any statutory voice in how much it receives.
This is contrary to international requirements of financial independence: an institution whose budget is set unilaterally by the executive it scrutinises cannot be financially independent of that executive.
CONTROL OF THE BUDGET
07 / 07
AWAMI LEAGUE ERA
NO SAY
No right to have a budget proposal considered.
s.25(1)
INTERIM ERA
PROPOSAL CONSIDERED
The Government must fix the allocation having considered the Commission’s own proposal.
s.35(1)
NOW
NO SAY
The Government simply allocates. No statutory role for the Commission’s proposal.
s.35(1)
What changed in 2026
The Commission loses any statutory voice in how much it receives.
Where the 2026 Bill falls below the 2009 Act
The 2009 Act was not a good law. GANHRI accredited Bangladesh's NHRC at Status B in 2011 and again in 2015, citing a limited mandate to investigate law-enforcement and security agencies, a selection committee composed largely of government appointees through a process that was neither transparent nor participatory, and senior staff seconded from ministries. Status B is the lowest accredited status. Bangladesh and the Maldives are the only national human rights institutions in South Asia at Status B.
That is the baseline. These are the points on which the 2026 Bill sits beneath even that 2009 baseline.
Who investigates an accused force
Who investigates an accused force
NHRC BILL 2026
The Commission requests the report from the accused force itself (s.19(1)).
NHRC ACT 2009
The Commission requests a report from the Government (s.18(1)).
NHRC BILL 2026
The Commission requests the report from the accused force itself (s.19(1)).
Consequence
The force writes the account of its own conduct. In 2009 the request went to the civilian government, which at least stood outside the accused institution and could be held politically answerable for the reply. In 2026 it goes to the institution under complaint. That is why this is deeper entrenchment than even the Awami League.
Who receives the recommendation about the accused force
Who receives the recommendation about the accused force
NHRC BILL 2026
The recommendation goes back to the same accused force (s.19(3)(খ)).
NHRC ACT 2009
The recommendation goes to the Government (s.18(3)(খ)).
NHRC BILL 2026
The recommendation goes back to the same accused force (s.19(3)(খ)).
Consequence
The civilian authority is removed from the loop. Nobody outside the accused institution is ever asked to act on the finding, and nothing obliges the force to accept it.
Guaranteed seat for ethnic minority communities
Guaranteed seat for ethnic minority communities
NHRC BILL 2026
A non-binding instruction to the selection committee: where a qualified candidate from an ethnic or disadvantaged community exists, that person is to be kept in priority consideration (s.5(3)).
NHRC ACT 2009
A mandatory composition requirement: the members must include at least one woman and at least one member of an ethnic community (s.5(3)).
NHRC BILL 2026
A non-binding instruction to the selection committee: where a qualified candidate from an ethnic or disadvantaged community exists, that person is to be kept in priority consideration (s.5(3)).
Consequence
A rule about who must sit becomes a rule about what the committee should think about. "Qualified" is undefined and judged by the same committee, and a Commission with no minority member breaches no clause that anyone can point to.
Legal aid and access to the courts
Legal aid and access to the courts
NHRC BILL 2026
Neither survives. The Fund may bear the cost of legal assistance (s.34(3)), but no provision empowers the Commission to act or appear for anyone.
NHRC ACT 2009
Legal assistance to a complainant was an express function (s.12(1)(দ)), and after a proven complaint the Commission could file, or arrange the filing of, an Article 102 application in the High Court for the aggrieved person (s.19(1)(খ)).
NHRC BILL 2026
Neither survives. The Fund may bear the cost of legal assistance (s.34(3)), but no provision empowers the Commission to act or appear for anyone.
Consequence
The Bill leaves the Commission able to pay a lawyer’s bill if it wishes to but not to bring or conduct a case for a victim. Where it decides a court is better placed (s.16(5)(ক)), it now simply refers the complainant to litigation they usually cannot afford.
Training the forces
Training the forces
NHRC BILL 2026
No training function of any kind anywhere in the Bill.
NHRC ACT 2009
An express function to train members of law-enforcement agencies in human rights protection (s.12(1)(থ)). The 2025 Ordinance kept this and extended it expressly to members of the disciplined forces (s.13(ভ)).
NHRC BILL 2026
No training function of any kind anywhere in the Bill.
Consequence
The Bill removes prevention in the same breath as investigation. The Commission may neither teach the forces beforehand nor investigate them afterwards.
Scrutiny of proposed laws
Scrutiny of proposed laws
NHRC BILL 2026
Only existing domestic law is examined against international instruments (s.13(জ)). Proposed law is not covered.
NHRC ACT 2009
Examine any proposed law for conformity with international human rights standards and recommend amendments (s.12(1)(ঃ)).
NHRC BILL 2026
Only existing domestic law is examined against international instruments (s.13(জ)). Proposed law is not covered.
Consequence
When Parliament debates a bill that would curtail rights, the Commission may no longer say so to Parliament. It can object only once the law is in force and the harm is done. This Bill is its own illustration: the Commission has no statutory standing to object to it.
Systemic inquiry
Systemic inquiry
NHRC BILL 2026
No equivalent function anywhere in the Bill.
NHRC ACT 2009
An express function to review the matters impeding human rights protection, including terrorist activity, and to recommend remedies (s.12(1)(ঙ)).
NHRC BILL 2026
No equivalent function anywhere in the Bill.
Consequence
The Commission can answer individual complaints but the specific function of examining systemic impediments to human-rights protection and recommending remedies has been removed. A pattern that is never officially named is never officially addressed.
Opening offices outside Dhaka
Opening offices outside Dhaka
NHRC BILL 2026
Prior government approval is required for an office anywhere beyond Dhaka (s.4).
NHRC ACT 2009
The Commission could establish offices at divisional, district and upazila level as it saw fit (s.4).
NHRC BILL 2026
Prior government approval is required for an office anywhere beyond Dhaka (s.4).
Consequence
The Bill no longer guarantees local physical access to the Commission. Whether the Commission may come closer is decided by the same executive whose agencies it exists to scrutinise. Approval can be withheld indefinitely without reasons, and the Bill gives the Commission no remedy and no deadline for an answer. The institution’s physical reach becomes a favour of the ministry rather than a power it exercises.
Residual competence
Residual competence
NHRC BILL 2026
No residual clause beyond the thirteen enumerated functions in s.13.
NHRC ACT 2009
A closing function permitting any other act considered necessary for the development of human rights (s.12(1)(ধ)).
NHRC BILL 2026
No residual clause beyond the thirteen enumerated functions in s.13.
Consequence
For the first time, the Commission loses its express residual power to undertake additional functions necessary for the protection of human rights. This makes its statutory mandate less flexible and removes an important safeguard against gaps the drafters did not anticipate.
What the Bill improves compared to the 2009 Act, and what those improvements are worth
The question is not whether the improvements exist but what they can deliver.
IMPROVEMENTS THAT ARE REAL BUT INCOMPLETE ON THEIR OWN TERMS
A National Preventive Mechanism
Carried over from the 2025 Ordinance, this is the single most valuable thing in the Bill: unannounced inspection of any place of detention, unrestricted access to custody registers, and private interviews with detainees. It is also the only preventive mechanism in the statute. But, unlike 2025, it is downgraded to a Unit as opposed to a Division, and the international requirement that its budget be separate and secured has been deleted altogether (s.33(8)).
Since it must now draw on the Commission’s general funds rather than a protected allocation, an unwilling Commission or an unwilling Government can leave it without the staff and money to operate, and no provision of the Act will have been breached. It is a paper tiger in the making.
Regulatory autonomy
The Commission may now make its own regulations without prior presidential approval (s.40), which neither earlier text allowed. Regulations under this Act govern internal machinery: how complaints are processed, how mediators are appointed and paid, the terms of service of staff, and the administration of the Fund. The gain is therefore real but confined to internal procedure. It gives the Commission control over how it does its administrative work, not over what work it is permitted to do.
Automatic removal for post-appointment disqualification
A sitting commissioner who later joins a political party or takes a disqualifying office becomes removable on that ground (s.9(2)(ঙ)). This is the cleanest improvement in the Bill and is new against both earlier texts.
IMPROVEMENTS THAT SECTION 19 CANCELS IN THE CASES THAT MATTER MOST
Its own investigation teams
Under the 2009 Act the Commission held only civil-court powers: summon witnesses, call for documents. In the 2026 Bill, and carried over from the 2025 Ordinance, the NHRC’s investigating officers now exercise the powers and duties of an investigating officer under the Code of Criminal Procedure (s.15(4)). However, section 19 switches the whole investigative capacity off wherever the accused is a disciplined force. So the Commission acquires investigators and is simultaneously forbidden from sending them against the institutions whose conduct demands it in the first place.
Enforceable compensation
Compensation orders may now be executed through a First Class Magistrate, with imprisonment for non-payment (s.24). Under the 2009 Act, the Commission could only recommend. But for a complaint against a force, the section 19 route means the matter does not reach the stage at which compensation can be ordered at all.
Both of these are real gains for complaints against private actors. They are unavailable in precisely the category of case that produced Bangladesh’s Status B.
THE REMAINDER
All commissioners full-time rather than two of seven; monthly rather than bi-monthly meetings; an express function to arrange treatment, rehabilitation and compensation for victims; an express duty to protect human rights defenders; and the removal of the 2009 carve-outs excluding matters within the Ombudsman’s remit and matters triable by the Administrative Tribunal, which widens the mandate on paper, though the Ombudsman Act has never been brought into operation in Bangladesh.
Section 19: how a complaint against a disciplined force actually proceeds
This provision deserves to be read in sequence, because its effect is not obvious from any single sub-section.
STEP ONE
ss.13, 15, 32
The Commission may investigate human rights violations anywhere in the country through its own investigating officers and investigation teams.
STEP TWO
s.19(1)
If the complaint is against a disciplined force, none of that applies. Section 19(1) opens "notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act" and directs the Commission instead to seek a report from the agency or institution concerned. The force investigates itself.
STEP THREE
s.19(2)
Section 19(2) requires that agency to submit a report. It fixes no deadline whatever. The accused institution answers when it chooses.
STEP FOUR
s.19(3)
If the Commission is satisfied by the force’s account of itself, the matter ends there (s.19(3)(ক)). If it is not satisfied, it makes non-binding recommendations, to that same accused force (s.19(3)(খ)).
STEP FIVE
s.19(4)
Only if the force fails to report back within forty-five days, or its response is unsatisfactory, may the Commission proceed under the ordinary complaint-resolution provisions.
Why the fallback in section 19(4) is hollow
The Bill does eventually let the Commission act. The question is: on what basis.
Having closed the door to independent investigation at the outset, the Commission holds no independently gathered evidence against which to test the force's account. It cannot know whether the report it has been handed is true or false, and therefore cannot form a reasoned view on whether to be satisfied or dissatisfied. Satisfaction becomes a matter of impression.
Meanwhile the clock runs. There is no deadline on the first report and forty-five days on the second stage. Custodial records, duty rosters, call data, CCTV and medical evidence do not survive that kind of correspondence, particularly when the institution holding them is the institution under complaint.
THREE FURTHER PROVISIONS COMPOUND THIS
The 2025 Ordinance expressly barred any member of the accused force from conducting the investigation. No such bar appears in the 2026 Bill.
The 2025 Ordinance expressly provided that no employer approval was needed to arrest a member of a disciplined force under investigation, so the accused's own institution could not block the step. That safeguard has also gone.
And the personal-liability provision for ignoring a Commission order names state institutions, government bodies and private companies, but not disciplined forces (s.27(3)).
The result is a closed circuit. The accused reports on itself, to a Commission that cannot check the report, on a timetable the accused controls, with recommendations returning to the accused, and no personal liability if the accused ignores them.
Who loses
These are not drafting defects to be corrected at leisure. Each has a constituency that will carry the cost.
Victims of state violence
Enforced disappearance, custodial death and extrajudicial killing in Bangladesh have overwhelmingly been the work of the police, RAB, and other disciplined forces. These are precisely the bodies section 19 shields in the 2026 Bill. A family that files a complaint will receive, in answer, a document the accused institution wrote about itself, on a timetable that institution controls, and no commander faces personal consequence for ignoring what the Commission then recommends.
People held in prisons, police stations, safe homes, and psychiatric institutions
The NPM is the Bill’s dedicated preventive mechanism, with powers of unannounced inspection. But the 2026 Bill removes its separate, secured budget. It must now compete with the Commission’s other functions for resources, weakening the mechanism designed to prevent abuse before it occurs. It risks becoming a paper tiger.
Ethnic and minority communities
The Commission may now be constituted without any member from an ethnic or disadvantaged community. The 2025 Ordinance also created thematic committees for religious minorities, hill and plains ethnic groups, the hijra community, the elderly, workers and migrant workers (s.32). The 2026 Bill names none of them and abolishes the committees.
Lawyers, journalists and activists who document abuses
The duty to protect defenders from harassment survives (s.13(ঞ)). But the Commission can no longer investigate the forces that harass them. So the practical power to discharge the duty has been curtailed.
Complainants outside Dhaka
The 2009 Act let the Commission open offices at divisional, district and upazila level as it judged necessary; the 2025 Ordinance guaranteed a divisional office. In the 2026 Bill, the Commission may not open an office anywhere beyond Dhaka without the Government’s prior approval (s.4). The Commission’s physical reach therefore depends on the executive whose agencies complainants may wish to challenge.
The international consequence for Bangladesh
WHERE THIS BILL FAILS, AND AGAINST WHICH STANDARD
Human rights mandate
PARIS PRINCIPLES A.1, A.2 · GO 1.2
Section 19 removes investigative competence over the state agents responsible for the gravest violations. This is the identical ground on which the Sub-Committee on Accreditation held Bangladesh at Status B in 2011 and 2015.
Ensuring pluralism
GENERAL OBSERVATION 1.7
Membership of an ethnic or disadvantaged community is no longer guaranteed. GANHRI treats pluralistic composition, including ethnicity and minority status, as integral to the institution’s independence, credibility and accessibility.
Selection and appointment of the decision-making body
GENERAL OBSERVATION 1.8
No published objective criteria for what makes a candidate qualified, five of nine committee seats tied to the Government or the ruling party, and the final choice exercised by the Prime Minister.
Adequate funding
GENERAL OBSERVATION 1.10
No statutory right to have its own budget proposal considered before the allocation is fixed by the government.
Functional independence of the preventive mechanism
OPCAT · UN SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF TORTURE
Bangladesh is required by treaty obligation to guarantee the NPM’s functional independence and to provide the resources necessary for it to function (Articles 18(1) and 18(3)). Yet the NPM’s separate and secured budget line has been deleted.
THE REALISTIC EXPOSURE
No route back to Status A
First, it forecloses any route back to Status A for the foreseeable future for Bangladesh, because it worsens the two findings on which Status B already rests.
A special review, outside the ordinary cycle
Second, the GANHRI Statute permits the Sub-Committee on Accreditation to trigger a special review whenever an institution’s circumstances change in a way that may affect compliance, and the enactment of a new constitutive statute that narrows the mandate is squarely such a change. Bangladesh has not been reviewed since March 2015, against a five-year cycle, so a review is in any event overdue.
Backsliding from protections already enacted
Third, the Sub-Committee on Accreditation has treated failure to address its concerns as evidence of non-compliance. In this case, there is an additional concern: backsliding. The 2025 Ordinance was already in force as law; the 2026 Bill removes several of its stronger safeguards. The issue is therefore not simply a failure to make progress, but a retreat from protections already enacted. Under the current GANHRI Statute, serious non-compliance can lead to suspension or removal of NHRC’s accreditation.
What this costs the newly elected Government
The new Government took office in February 2026 with a two-thirds majority, on a mandate built substantially on a promised break with the Awami League era. This is the first human rights institution legislation of that Government, approved by its Cabinet and heading to a Parliament it controls, and it will produce the first accreditation finding made about Bangladesh under it.
An adverse GANHRI finding would therefore carry particular weight. It would not be a mere domestic political allegation, but a published technical finding on permanent public record, made by the international body whose entire function is to assess such questions. Such a finding would also be cited in subsequent UN and international human rights reviews of Bangladesh. It arrives while the Government is seeking international support, investment and cooperation on the strength of the same claim it would contradict.
ON URGENCY
The Bill is still pending. Is this meant to influence the outcome, or to stand as a warning after the fact?
“I very much hope it influences the outcome. The last bad NHRC law remained with us for 15 years. It took a revolution, an enormous loss of life and thousands of victims of repression before we got the opportunity to rebuild these institutions.
“We cannot say, ‘perhaps we will fix it in another 15 years.’ This is the moment to fix it.”
The difficulty is also readily curable. Restoring the Commission's independent investigative authority over complaints involving disciplined forces, the composition guarantee for ethnic or disadvantaged communities, the Commission's statutory role in the budget process, and the separate and secured allocation for the National Preventive Mechanism would address four of the Bill's most serious weaknesses without requiring the Bill itself to be abandoned. They would require merely four amendments.
FOUR AMENDMENTS, IN A SESSION THAT BEGINS ON 27 AUGUST 2026
IN CLOSING
What do you hope happens as a result of this report?
“Both the public and lawmakers. I want the public to understand what is being done in their name, and lawmakers to understand that the public is watching and judging these choices. That is what democracy is supposed to look like.”
The three laws compared against the Paris Principles and GANHRI's General Observations
All seventeen benchmarks, grouped by where the 2026 Bill lands against the two laws before it.
Power to hear any person and obtain any information, as applied to the disciplined forces
C.2 / A.1 · GO 1.2
Carve-out reinstated and deepened. Report sought from the accused force itself, expressly overriding the general power, with no deadline for that first report (s.19).
Verdict
Below both earlier laws. The central defect GANHRI has penalised Bangladesh for since 2011.
Pluralism in membership
B.1 · GO 1.7
One woman (s.5(1)). Minority representation reduced to priority consideration for a qualified candidate (s.5(3)).
Verdict
Below both earlier laws, including loss of guaranteed seat for minorities. GANHRI has already found "only one woman" insufficient in a comparable review.
Effective access for complainants
C.1 · GO 1.2
Neither the function nor the branch survives. Legal assistance remains only as a permitted head of Fund expenditure (s.34(3)).
Verdict
Below both earlier laws. A power to spend replaces a power to act, with no machinery to discharge it.
Breadth of mandate and residual competence
A.1 / A.2 · GO 1.2
Thirteen functions and no residual clause. Some Awami League-era functions are merged rather than lost, but five are genuinely absent: proposed-law scrutiny, training the forces, systemic inquiry, legal aid, and the residual power itself.
Verdict
Below both earlier laws. The mandate becomes a closed list for the first time since the NHRC was created in Bangladesh.
Review of proposed legislation against international standards
A.3(a)
Absent for proposed law. Only existing domestic law is examined against international instruments (s.13(জ)).
Verdict
Below both earlier laws. Pre-legislative human rights scrutiny disappears from Bangladeshi law.
Immunity for acts done in good faith
GO 2.3
No equivalent provision.
Verdict
Below the Awami League-era Act, and unaddressed in the Interim-era Ordinance. GO 2.3 treats this protection as a component of independence.
Selection and appointment of the decision-making body
B.1 · GO 1.8
Speaker in the chair, both ministers restored, press seat and civil-society consultation dropped. Five of nine seats tied to the Government or the ruling party (s.7(1)).
Verdict
Far below the Interim-era Ordinance, and reproduces the Awami League-era defect that GANHRI named in 2015 as reason for Status B.
Independence of the final appointment
GO 1.8
Two names per vacancy, interview stage dropped (s.8(ঘ)). Under Article 48(3) of the Constitution, the choice is exercised on the Prime Minister’s advice.
Verdict
Below the Interim-era Ordinance. Executive discretion re-enters at the last step, on top of a committee the executive already dominates.
Statutory guarantee of independence
A.2
Reverts to a statement of manner: the Commission acts with complete impartiality (s.3(2)).
Verdict
Below the Interim-era Ordinance. The only explicit anti-subordination clause is withdrawn.
Enforceability of recommendations against the forces
C.1 · GO 1.6
The personal-liability provision names state and government institutions and private companies. Disciplined forces are not named (s.27(3)).
Verdict
Below the Interim-era Ordinance. A force commander who ignores the Commission faces no express personal consequence.
Autonomy and ring-fenced funding of the National Preventive Mechanism
OPCAT · SPT
Renamed a Unit. "Separate" and "secured" both deleted; the Commission must keep a "necessary" allocation from its own funds (s.33(8)).
Verdict
Below the Interim-era Ordinance, far above the Awami League-era Act. Fails the requirement, set by the UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture, that a national preventive mechanism hold financial autonomy distinct from its parent institution.
Standing attention to specific vulnerable communities
A.3 · GO 1.7
No thematic committees. The monitoring duty survives in composite form, naming only women, children, disabled persons and other vulnerable groups (s.13(গ)).
Verdict
Below the Interim-era Ordinance, above the Awami League-era Act. The duty survives; the standing machinery and the named communities behind it do not.
Adequate funding and control of resources
B.2 · GO 1.10
Government simply allocates. No statutory role for the Commission’s proposal (s.35(1)).
Verdict
Below the Interim-era Ordinance, level with the Awami League-era Act. Statutory safeguard of financial autonomy is weakened.
Security of remuneration
B.2 · GO 1.10
No equivalent section. Pay returns to the annual appropriations vote.
Verdict
Below the Interim-era Ordinance, level with the Awami League-era Act.
Protection of human rights defenders
C(f) AND (g)
Retained: legal steps to protect persons and institutions engaged in human rights protection from harassment (s.13(ঞ)).
Verdict
Held against the Interim-era Ordinance, and above the Awami League-era Act.
Encouraging ratification and accession
A.3(c) · GO 1.3
Retained in modified form (s.13(ঝ)).
Verdict
Held across all three.
Regulatory autonomy
No prior approval required (s.40).
Verdict
Above both earlier laws. The Commission gains control of its own internal procedure, though not of any power the law withholds from it.
Source: Analysis of the National Human Rights Commission Bill 2026 · August 2026