Where will the Sanctions go?

Can renaming RAB as the Special Response Battalion (SRB) help Bangladesh avoid US sanctions? That is our central question surrounding the Special Response Battalion Bill, 2026.

The question has become sharper after the UN human rights chief’s latest warning. On September 7, Volker Türk told the UN Human Rights Council that Bangladesh still needs “a strengthened and independent national institution” to oversee its security forces. His call came a day after parliament passed the National Human Rights Commission Bill, 2026 and the Enforced Disappearance Prevention and Redress Bill, 2026. The new disappearance law keeps investigations with the police and does not create an independent investigative body.

The SRB bill now faces the same basic test. The government says it will dissolve the Rapid Action Battalion and establish a modern, accountable force under the Bangladesh Police. But critics ask what will really change if RAB’s officers, powers, buildings, equipment, and sensitive records all move directly into SRB.

The stakes reach beyond Bangladesh's borders. Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed has said that renaming RAB or forming a new elite force could lead Washington to “reconsider the sanctions.” Yet a rebrand that keeps the old structure intact, while leaving records and oversight poorly protected, could produce the opposite effect.

The bill was tabled in the Jatiya Sangsad on September 3. On September 8, the parliamentary standing committee recommended sending a revised version back to parliament. The bill is therefore not final. There is still time to settle the questions that will decide whether SRB marks a genuine break from RAB, or simply carries its unresolved past forward under a new name.

The Sanctions Bangladesh Wants Lifted

RAB was formed in 2004. Most allegations of enforced disappearance, torture, and extrajudicial killing against it relate to the Awami League government period from 2009 to August 2024. Many of the victims were linked to opposition politics, especially the BNP, which was the main opposition party for most of those years.

BNP itself has long demanded RAB’s abolition. Its leader Khaleda Zia called for disbanding the force as far back as 2014, after meeting families of disappeared party leaders and comparing RAB to a force that could not be reformed. BNP repeated this demand in 2024, submitting a formal proposal to the government’s Police Reform Commission calling for RAB to be dissolved entirely, with its legitimate functions absorbed by existing police units.

On December 10, 2021, the US Treasury sanctioned RAB under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act for serious human rights abuses. It also designated six serving and former officers: Chowdhury Abdullah Al-Mamun, Benazir Ahmed, Khan Mohammad Azad, Tofayel Mustafa Sorwar, Mohammad Jahangir Alam, and Mohammad Anwar Latif Khan.

The US State Department separately imposed visa restrictions on Benazir Ahmed and Lieutenant Colonel Miftah Uddin Ahmed over the 2018 killing of Teknaf councillor Ekramul Haque. Seven individuals were targeted across the two US actions. The sanctions froze assets, blocked US transactions, and damaged RAB's international standing.

What the Bill Actually Does

The Special Response Battalion Bill, 2026, creates SRB as a specialised unit under the Bangladesh Police. Under Article 4(1), SRB will be the new force. Article 4(2) allows the government to form it by posting or deputing officers and staff from the Bangladesh Police, other disciplined forces, and other agencies as needed.

This means SRB will not necessarily be a completely new organisation built from fresh recruitment. Its members may come from the same institutions that currently supply personnel to RAB. The bill does not require individual screening of RAB members before they are moved into the new force. It also does not explain whether officers accused of serious past abuses will be barred, suspended, or reviewed before being transferred.

Article 7 says SRB will be headed by a Director General chosen from serving Bangladesh Police officers of at least the rank of Additional Inspector General. The Director General will have administrative, financial, and operational powers. Under Article 8, however, the force will operate under the supervision and control of the Inspector General of Police, in accordance with procedures set by the government.

The bill also gives SRB extensive powers. Article 10 sets out its duties, including protecting public safety, combating terrorism and organised crime, recovering illegal arms and explosives, taking action against narcotics, cybercrime, enforced disappearance, land grabbing, human trafficking, kidnapping, violence against women and children, and gathering intelligence. It can also assist other law enforcement agencies and carry out other duties assigned by the government.

Under Articles 11 to 13, SRB members may carry weapons and use police-style powers of entry, search, seizure, detention, arrest, and investigation, subject to the Code of Criminal Procedure and other existing laws. Article 14 says that arrested people and seized evidence must be handed over to the nearest police station without delay. Article 15 allows SRB to investigate criminal cases when ordered by a court, the government, or the Inspector General of Police. It also allows SRB to maintain its own lock-ups, evidence storage rooms, and interrogation rooms.

The key clause is Article 27. Article 27(1) repeals only the provisions that created RAB in 2003. Article 27(2) keeps RAB's 2005 disciplinary rules in force until new rules are in place. Article 27(3) is the real transfer mechanism. It moves RAB's manpower, orders, powers, authority, benefits, funds, cash and bank deposits, debts, contracts, movable and immovable property, and “all account books, registers, records, and related documents” straight into SRB.

In simple terms, the bill gives SRB a broad mandate and strong police powers while moving much of RAB's structure into it. The real test is whether the new rules, training, oversight, and accountability system will be strong enough to make SRB meaningfully different.

Why the Records Matter

RAB's internal documents, including posting orders, custody registers, operation files, and duty rosters, can be crucial evidence in unresolved disappearance and torture cases. They may be the only way to prove where an officer was, what unit he served in, or who was on duty on a given day.

The Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances found that nearly 25 per cent of the disappearance cases it examined involved RAB. It identified 40 secret detention facilities, and said 22 or 23 were allegedly run by the force. Many of these cases remain under investigation.

If an accused officer denies being posted somewhere, RAB's own record may be the only proof otherwise. Once RAB is dissolved, any document SRB later produces about RAB's past raises a legal question: on what basis can a court treat it as authentic?

Article 27(3) says the records will be transferred. But it does not require a signed inventory, joint verification, a clear chain of custody, or penalties for losing or altering records during the transfer. That could leave room for legal challenge in future cases.

The same gap applies to physical sites. Several RAB facilities are alleged crime scenes tied to disappearance and torture cases. Yet the bill does not require them to be preserved. Nothing in it stops repainting, renovation, or removal of fixtures before investigators finish their work.

Transparency International Bangladesh raised a related warning on September 6. It said that weak external oversight and broader powers could bring the RAB back under a different name. The bill's grievance mechanism, under Article 24, does little to ease that concern. The committee may call witnesses and seek documents under Article 24(3), but it will be chaired by an SRB Additional Director General. The body meant to check SRB, therefore, sits within SRB's own command structure.

The Test for Washington

None of this proves the government wants to erase evidence. A more likely explanation is procedural: in the rush to complete a rebrand before the Prime Minister's first UN General Assembly appearance this month, the details of a clean, legally sound handover may simply not have been worked out in time.

But that explanation does not remove the risk. Foreign governments, courts, and rights bodies will judge this law by outcomes, not intentions. Did records survive intact? Were possible crime scenes protected? Did the new force have independent oversight? Did officers facing past allegations face real accountability?

The revised bill gives parliament one more chance to answer these questions before SRB becomes law. If it does not, a new name may not be enough to change Washington's mind.